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COMMENTS
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CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION OF
CRIMINAL CO-DEFENDANTS

The sixth and fourteenth amendments guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel.1 Effective representation includes both the
concept of a minimum level of competence,2
and the requirement of counsel's undivided
loyalty to client.3 It is this obligation of loyalty

which is at issue when an attorney undertakes
to represent two or more criminal defendants
in the same or related proceedings.
There are various reasons why co-defendants

may share the services of a single attorney. A
trial court may request that the retained attorney of one defendant represent a co-defendant
whose own attorney has for some reason be1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,71 (1932) ("[F]ailure of the trial court to make an effective appoint- come unavailable or unacceptable, or the court
may initially appoint single counsel for indigent
ment of counsel was... a denial of due process within
co-defendants for the sake of economy and
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
Ever since the trial judge's appointment of the
efficient procedure. Co-defendants may thementire county bar to defend the Scotsboro boys
selves retain the same attorney because they
was deemed a denial of the "effective assistance
wish to collaborate in presenting a common
of counsel" it has been assumed by most courts
defense, or in order to save money, or simply
to be axiomatic that any right to representation
involves a right to "effective" or "adequate"
because it seems the easiest course.4 Joint repassistance.
resentation thus serves many interests. But it
Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Groundfor Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 also involves the risk that full and effective
representation of the defendants will be jeopNw. U.L. REV. 289, 292 (1964). "It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to ardized. When the interests of co-defendants
the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Rich- diverge, the attorney faces conflicting duties
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
2 The standard for finding a denial of the right to which may force him to compromise the intercounsel on the ground of incompetence has tradition- ests of at least one of his clients.
The Supreme Court held in Glasser v. United
ally been that the representation is so bad as to
amount to no representation at all-"a farce and a States' that appointment by the trial court of
mockery." United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737, 739
one attorney to represent co-defendants when
(8th Cir. 1974). See generally Waltz, supra note 1. This
standard is being reformulated in some jurisdictions, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 876 (1975) (legal assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation); Her-

ring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (reasonably effective assistance); McQueen v. Swenson, 498
F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974) (reasonably competent assistance), but it remains a subjective standard dependant
on the particular circumstances and generally requiring but a minimum of skill and preparation.
3"We interpret the right to counsel as the right to
effective counsel .... We consider undivided loyalty

of appointed counsel to client as essential to due
process." MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th
Cir. 1960). "The right to the assistance of counsel

means knowledgeable counsel who is unhampered
or unfettered in his professional responsibility to the
accused." Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425

F.2d 271, 278-79 (8th Cir. 1970).
1 In United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d
Cir. 1976), for example, where the defendant wished
to be represented by the attorney retained by her co-

defendant, the reasons defendant gave for choosing
to share counsel were that she could not afford to
hire a separate attorney, that she was very frightened
and felt she knew this lawyer, and that the lawyer
was familiar with the facts of the case. Id. at 788
n.10. Berstein is discussed in text following note 194
infra.
5 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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it was aware of possibly inconsistent interests
was an infringement of the defendant's fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. The
courts have relied on Glasser in applying the
constitutional guarantee of effective representation to cases of privately retained counsel,6
where the trial court is not responsible for
imposing the joint representation, and to situations where conflicting interests not apparent
at the outset develop during the course of trial.'
Since Glasser guaranteed the right of conflictfree representation, but did not prohibit all
multiple representation, 8 the courts have attempted to devise standards for reviewing cases
in which the defendant later claims his defense
was prejudiced by joint representation. It is
generally agreed that the Glasser standard is an
objective one which avoids confronting the capabilities of the individual attorney. The competence of defense counsel is not at issue. 9 The
problem on review is rather to decide in retrospect whether the attorney was in fact faced
with conflicting responsibilities. Decisions vary
as to the standard of proof required in order
to show that a conflict of interests existed which
prejudiced an accused's defense. However, be6

E.g., United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038,
1043 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Foster, 469
F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1972); Larry Buffalo Chief v.
South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271, 279 (8th Cir. 1970);
Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir.
1954). For a discussion of agency and state action
theories purporting to distinguish retained from appointed counsel, see Waltz, supra note 1 at 296-301;
Note, 89 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1976).
Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d at
279; Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d at 359. If the
conflict is apparent at the outset, it may be grounds
for severance or for the appointment of separate
counsel. Where the appropriate motions are not
made or are denied, or where the conflict arises only
during the course of trial, there may be grounds for
reversal of the conviction of one or more of the
defendants.
8 [AII courts have recognized that common representation; without a showing of conflicting
interests, is not in itself a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, and that there may be excellent
reasons for preferring the use of a single attorney in a particular case.
United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976). See, e.g.,

Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (mere fact of a single

attorney is not evidence of lack of effective counsel);
Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969) (sixth amend-

ment is not violated by joint representation unless a
conflict of interests results).

cause the concepts of conflict of interests and
prejudice are not always clearly separated, it is
often difficult to determine what standards of
review the courts are actually applying.
In addition to the problem of reviewing
conflicts of interest on appeal, multiple representation also raises the question of what procedure the trial courts can follow at the outset
to minimize the number of trials involving
simultaneous representation of inconsistent interests, and to avoid where possible the necessity for a difficult retrospective determination
that a conflict existed. Courts disagree about
the obligation of the trial judge to determine
whether potential conflicts of interest threaten
to impede effective representation. Furthermore, if the judge concludes that there is a
substantial risk of conflict, there may be an
issue as to his power to disqualify the attorney
for the defense and to require separate counsel
despite defendants' insistence on presenting a
joint defense.
This comment will consider the areas of
uncertainty and disagreement in the review of
conflict of interest claims in recent criminal
cases, 10 focusing primarily on decisions by the
federal courts. It will examine in particular (1)
the problem on appeal of deciding whether'a
prejudicial conflict of interests existed at trial;
(2) the types of situations in which conflicts
most readily occur; (3) the pre-trial obligations
of the court in determining whether there are
potential conflicts and whether the defendants
The terms "inadequate" and "ineffective" assistance of counsel are used in cases involving conflicts
of interest to mean that full representation of the
defendant was impossible due to irreconcilable interests. The same terms appear in the different line of
cases which focus on the level of competence of the
individual attorney, or the adequacy of preparation
for the defense in terms of time and attention. See
note 2 supra.
10An analysis of the problems of multiple representation based on cases through 1970 is presented
in Note, CriminalCodefendantsand the Sixth Amendment:
The Case for Separate Counsel, 6 GRIM. L. BULL. 432
(1970). The author, feeling that state and federal
decisions have often misinterpreted Glasser, concludes that the appropriate standard of review is a
finding of a genuine conflict of interests. Where
there is a genuine conflict, prejudice to the defendant
can always be assumed. The trial court, to protect
defendants' rights, should "order separate counsel at
the slightest hint of a conflict of interest." 6 GRIM. L.
BULL. at 453. See also Note, Conflict of Interests: Multiple
DefendantsRepresented by a Single Court-Appointed Counsel, 74 DICK. L. REv. 241 (1970).
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are sufficiently aware of the dangers of joint
representation; and (4) the extent of the right
of defendants to waive conflict-free representation.
GLASSER V. UNITED STATES

The single Supreme Court decision holding
that joint representation may infringe upon an
accused's right to counsel is Glasser v. United
States." Glasser and Kretske were co-defendants in a conspiracy case. On the day set for
trial Kretske's attorney requested a continuance. When the court denied the motion and
appointed another attorney to represent him,
Kretske objected. The court then asked Glasser's lawyer, Stewart, if he would represent
Kretske as well as Glasser. When Stewart
pointed out that inconsistencies in the defense
would make the joint representation appear
awkward and misleading to a jury, to the disadvantage of Glasser, the court ordered
Kretske's appointed attorney to continue until
he could be replaced. In light of the unsatisfactory alternatives-delay, severance, commencing trial with a lawyer not satisfactory to
Kretske, or joint representation which would
tend to associate Glasser with Kretske-Stewart
then suggested that if the court would appoint
him to represent Kretske, the jury might realize
that the parties could not control the court
order and might therefore be less apt to associate the two defendants. The court did appoint
Stewart to represent Kretske. Glasser and
Kretske were subsequently convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed Glasser's conviction on the ground that the appointment of
his attorney to represent jointly a co-defendant
with inconsistent interests denied him his constitutional right to counsel.
[T]he "assistance of counsel" guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court
order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests. If the right
to the assistance of counsel means less than this,
a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially
impaired 12

The Court found indications of the conflicting
interests of the two defendants in counsel's
conduct of cross-examination and in his re11315 U.S. 60 (1942).
12Id. at 70.
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sponse to evidence introduced by the prosecution. Thorough cross-examination of a prosecution witness was awkward when his testimony
was more damaging to one defendant than to
the other. When counsel failed to cross-examine a prosecution witness, the Court made the
reasonable inference that, since rigorous crossexamination was indicated in the circumstances, failure to cross-examine was due to
conflicting obligations. In addition, evidence
perhaps inadmissible as to one defendant was
not objected to "lest an objection on behalf of
Glasser alone leave with the jury the impression
that the testimony was true as to Kretske."'13
Again, an inference was drawn from the fact
that objection might have been made and was
not. The Court did not decide whether there
was sufficient proof of Glasser's connection
with the conspiracy such that the evidence
would have been admissible over objection.
"The important fact is that no objection was
offered ... on Glasser's behalf.""
Having determined the existence of inconsistent interests in the defense of Glasser and
Kretske, which during the course of the trial
prejudiced Glasser's defense, the Court held
that Glasser was "denied . . .his right to have
the effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment."'" The important
fact was that Glasser was prejudiced by the
conflict, not how significant the prejudice was
to his conviction.
To determine the precise degree of prejudice
sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's
appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske is
at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial. 6
The Court refused to set aside Kretske's conviction, even though Kretske was represented by
an attorney laboring under conflicting obligations, as he had not been prejudiced by the
joint appointment.
When the trial court was made aware of the
possibility of inconsistent interests, it had a
responsibility to safeguard Glasser's right to
the undivided attention of his counsel.
13Id. at 74.
14Id.at 75.
15Id.at 76.
16Id. at 75-76.
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Of equal importance with the duty of the court
to see that an accused has the assistance of
counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing
counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting,
or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which
might diverge from those of his first client, when
the possibility7 of that divergence is brought home
to the court.

Although Glasser did not renew an initial objection to sharing his attorney with Kretske, the
Court rejected the suggestion that he tacitly
acquiesced in the joint appointment, despite
the fact that Glasser was an experienced attorney.' The Court relied on the standard of
waiver stated in Johnson v. Zerbst'9 as to the
general right to counsel.
The trial court should protect the right of an
accused to have the assistance of counsel. "This
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver by the accused. While an accused may
waive the right to counsel, whether there is a
proper waiver should be clearly determined by
the trial court, and it would be fitting and
appropriate for that determination to appear
20
upon the record."
Thus Glasser held that the sixth amendment
right to counsel includes the right to assistance
of counsel unimpaired (not prejudiced) by conflicting obligations to another. A waiver of this
fundamental right will not be assumed from
defendant's silence, but must be an intelligent
and competent waiver, clearly determined by
the trial court.
STANDARD OF REViEW

Application of the standard formulated by
the Supreme Court has been so varied and
uncertain as to lead commentators to the conclusion that there is "virtually no discernible
standard. ' 21 The difficulty on review is to determine in retrospect whether a substantial
conflict actually existed at trial. Some courts
have been more willing than others to infer
17 Id.

at 76.
1s Id. at 70.
19304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20315 U.S. at 71, (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. at 465).
21 6 CRIM L. BULL., supra note 10, at 440, 443. See
also 74 DICK. L. REv., supra note 10, at 256.

from indications in the record that inconsistent
interests impeded the defense. The concept of
prejudice has also caused a great deal of confusion. The decisions are apparently inconsistent regarding the necessity for showing prejudice, some maintaining that Glasser does not
require proof of prejudice, some implying that
proof of conflict necessarily indicates prejudice.
Some of these variations are undoubtedly due
to differing interpretations of Glasser, while
others can be explained as failures clearly to
articulate certain distinctions.
Determining the Existence of Conflict
The mere assertion on appeal that there was
a conflict of interests at trial is obviously insufficient to overturn a conviction. The courts
have always required that there be some factual
showing of inconsistent interests.2 2 However,
there are varying judicial expressions for describing this requirement. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has said there must be an "actual,
significant conflict;" there is no violation where
conflict is "irrelevant or merely hypothetical."'
The Eighth Circuit requires evidence of actual
conflict or "a substantial possibility of a
conflict."' Other courts say that "possible conflict"25 "however remote, ' 26 will render joint
representation constitutionally defective. These
different expressions could be viewed as consistent if they refer to different times in the
proceedings when conflicts are typically alleged. Thus on a motion for separate counsel
at the outset or during the course of a trial, it
would be appropriate to require the defendant
to show a substantial possibility of inconsistent
interests, whereas on appeal, only an actual,
relevant conflict would support a claim of inef22 See, e.g., United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d
448, 452 (2d Cir. 1973) ("some real conflict of interest
... must be shown to exist"); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
940 (1963) (some conflict of interest); Boehmer v.
United States, 414 F. Supp. 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
("a claim of conflict of interest must be based on
some factual support").
2 Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1077
n.7 (5th Cir. 1975).
24 United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414, 416
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
25 Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967); State v. Green, 129
N.J. Super. 157, 322 A.2d 495 (App. Div. 1974).
26 United States ex rel. Horta v. DeYoung, 523
F.2d 807, 808-09 (3rd Cir. 1975).
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fective assistance of counsel. There is, however,
little indication that courts draw this distinction." It is far more likely that the different
expressions reflect uncertainty as to how much
evidence of a conflictual situation ought to be
required.
Of course, some cases expressly differ from
others as to the standard of proof necessary to
show conflict. The Seventh Circuit has held
that the defendant must establish the existence28
of a conflict by clear and convincing evidence,
or "with a reasonable degree of specificity,"'2 9
while the District of Columbia Circuit is willing
to go a long way in finding conflict, relying on
"indications in the record that stir doubts."
Like the famous tip of the iceberg, the record
may not reveal the whole story; apparently minor
instances in the record which suggest co-defendants' conflicting interests may well be the telltale
signs of deeper conflict. Because of this, and
because of the fundamental nature of the right
involved, when there are indications in the record that stir doubts about the effectiveness of
joint representation, those doubts should be resolved in favor of the defendant ....

[O]nly

where "we can find no basis in the record for an
informed speculation that appellant's rights
were prejudicially affected," can the conviction
stand.3°

As Judge Skelly Wright indicates in the above
passage, there is a pervasive difficulty in dealing with questions of conflict at the appellate
level. Except in blatant situations where the
interests of one defendant have been quite
obviously neglected or sacrificed in favor of a
co-defendant, the reviewing court is often
searching the record for what is not there.
When defense counsel has represented inconsistent interests as well as possible under the
circumstances, a determination of whether
there was a conflict may depend on focusing
on omissions from the record, or alternative
defense strategies not pursued. For the review27 The court in Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620,
623 (8th Cir. 1973) does distinguish the substantial
possibility of conflict at the outset from actual conflict
developing during trial, not in relation to the defendant's standard of proof, but rather as affecting the
obligation of the trial court to foresee the conflict of
interests.
2sCurry v. Burke, 404 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1968).
29 United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
30Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 246-47
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (quoting Anderson v. United States,
352 F.2d 945, 947 (1965)).

[Vol. 68

ing court, this may indeed involve speculation
and perhaps seem like an excursion into the
hypothetical. Thus some of the variations in
decisions between those which find the existence of conflict on particular facts and those
which reject a claim of conflict on similar facts
can be explained by the extent to which the
court is willing to credit certain indications in
the record. One factor affecting the court's
judgment in this respect may be that the attorney's conduct of the trial is relevant evidence
for determining the existence of conflicts of
interest. Most courts have recognized the difference between a retrospective evaluation of
trial strategy and a finding that the defense
was impeded by inconsistent interests. But occasionally a determination of conflict is mixed
with expressions more appropriate to an assessment of the competence of counsel. 31 This suggests that the confusion of standards may have
influenced other courts to reject claims of conflict.
As a rule, courts are reluctant to evaluate
defense tactics from hindsight.32 Whether to
cross-examine a witness and when to offer
objection to evidence are matters of judgment,
not ordinarily to be corrected on review. But
3' People v. Anderson, 59 Cal. App. 3d 831, 131
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1976), rejected a claim of conflict of
interests between the defendant and a prosecution
witness previously represented by the public defender's office. Although the claim failed for lack of
proof of any conflict, the court added that "inadequacy [of counsel] must have resulted in the withdrawal of a crucial defense so as to reduce the trial
to a 'farce or a sham.'" 59 Cal. App. 3d at 844, 131 Cal
Rptr. at 111. In United States v. Valenzuela, 521
F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916
(1976), the defendant appealed his conviction on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming
both incompetence and conflict of interests. The
court found no conflict and at the same time agreed
that defense counsel could properly have objected to
certain testimony indirectly implicating the defendant. Counsel's failure to object or to request a cautionary instruction limiting admissibility of the testimony only to the co-defendant, whom counsel also
represented, was judged not by the standards for
determining the existence of conflicting obligations,
but by the basic unfairness test used in judging
general competence.
"2[I]n choosing trial tactics "the exercise of a
defense attorney's professional judgment should
not be second-guessed by hindsight .... " A
wrong or poorly advised decision by a defense
attorney is not alone enough to support a subsequent claim of ineffective counsel.
United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir.
1974), (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d
1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)).
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the Court in Glasser considered instances of
failure to object and to cross-examine as evidence in the record from which it could "reasonably be inferred" that defense counsel was
hindered by the inherent contradiction of conflicting loyalties. The nature of the conflict is
that counsel is faced with the necessity of foregoing possible means of defending one client
because of his obligation to protect his other
client. The question is not whether counsel
actually perceived the conflict, or whether he
would in fact have chosen to conduct the defense differently had there been no conflict.3
In fact, an attorney's skill in dealing with inconsistent interests by evenhanded compromise
may even obscure on the record the basic
unfairness to a defendant of subordinating his
legitimate interests to other considerations.3
Thus it should be clearly recognized that although defense tactics provide the evidence
from which a conflict can be inferred, trial
strategy is evaluated only in the sense that
counsel must have beenfree to choose an appro35
priate defense.
How divergent, then, are the standards applied on review? The courts certainly agree
that an allegation of conflict of interests must
Mere errors ofjudgment on the part of counsel
are not sufficient to establish ineffective assistance; nor is it the function of a reviewing court

to evaluate the relative efficacy of trial tactics by
counsel.
Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1973).
' "Beyond determining whether the foreclosed
defense was plausible, we are reluctant to speculate
on what defenses counsel might have chosen." Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1080 (5th Cir.
1975). "The issue in this case is not why a particular
defense was chosen .... This is not simply a case

where appellant!" now criticizes 'the defense adopted
from hindsight."' Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d at
625. Except in cases where the attorney is relied on
to perceive inconsistent interests and take appropriate action (see text following note 144 infra), the
courts have not inquired into, or have even disregarded, counsel's own evaluation of the extent to
which conflicting obligations impeded defense strat-

egy.
11 It must be remembered that in cases involving
conflicts of interest, the conflict does not always
appear full-blown upon the record since counsel
may throughout endeavor to reconcile the conflict.
Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d at 1080, (quoting
Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d at 626).

' See Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d at 1079
(counsel's choice of defense was not a free choice of
strategy). Foxworth is discussed in text following note
53 infra.

have some factual support. They are aware not
only of the serious threat to effective representation which is posed by a situation of conflict,
but also of the elusive character of the proof
inVolved. The differences seem to lie in the
varying expressions of willingness to infer conflict from indications which can be quite inconclusive in themselves. Furthermore, although
some showing of conflict is expressly required,
the concept of conflict is not always distinguished from the determination whether the
defendant has actually been harmed.
The Prejudice Standard
The Supreme Court in Glasser held that a
conflict of interests infringes upon a defendant's constitutional rights if he is prejudiced,
but that it is unnecessary to determine "the
precise degree of prejudice." This holding has
been understood by some courts to require
that the defendant prove prejudice, 36 while
other courts, as well as several commentators,
state that Glasser does not require proof of
specific prejudice.37 The source of the confusion seems to be that the term "prejudice" is
used to mean injury, as when one asks which
of two defendants was adversely affected, but
it also refers to substantial harm which contributes to the defendant's conviction,
that is, the
8
opposite of harmless error.
A careful reading of Glasser suggests that
conflict of interest cases require analysis in
36

E.g., Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145, 148
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (some
prejudice must be shown); United States v. Lovano,
420 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071
(1970). (some specific instance of prejudice, some
real conflict of interest); Fryar v. Unites States, 404
F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
964 (1969) (joint representation becomes improper
only
37 in those cases where prejudice results).
E.g', Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620, 624 (8th

Cir. 1973) (no prejudice need be shown). United
States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1972) (ordinarily, prejudice assumed from the existence of conflict);
United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir.
1967) (no need to show prejudice); Sawyer v. Brough,
358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966) (possibility of harm
sufficient). Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1108-09 (1973) found that

many courts apparently ignore "the language in
Glasser as to the lack of necessity of showing specific
prejudice." See 6 CRIM. L. BULL., supra note 9 at
442-44, 450; Note, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 913, 922, 933
n.5 (1976); Note, 14 WASHBURN L. REV. 541, 551

(1975).
3 The Supreme Court formulated the federal
standard for harmless error in Chapman v. Califor-
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three steps. First, some divergence must be
described in the positions of the defendants.
In Glasser, Kretske was more directly implicated
in the conspiracy than was Glasser. Stewart,
the attorney, was very reluctant to associate
them in the eyes of the jury. Second, it must
be shown that the attorney made a choice
between possible alternative courses of action,
such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence
helpful to one client but harmful to the other.
If he did not make such a choice, the conflict
remained hypothetical. 39 If he did, the conflict
materialized, and it is at least theoretically possible to determine which client was protected
by the action chosen, and which was prejudiced
in the sense of sacrificing his best defense. It is
only the latter who is in fact denied the effective
assistance of counsel. 40 Third, the harmless
error rule is not applied, because any choice
mandated by inconsistent obligations and surrendering a possible means of defense is impermissible. The error cannot be weighed to determine whether it was harmless in the circumnia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), stating that the error must be
found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
24. The Court described harmless error as follows:
[T]here may be some constitutional errors which
in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal
of the conviction ....

The question is whether

there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the
conviction."
Id. at 22-23, (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85, 86-87 (1963)). The Court distinguished certain
rights which would not, however, be subjected to-the
rule. "[T]here are some constitutional rights so basic
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error." Id. at 23. The cases cited
involved coerced confession, impartial judge, and
right to counsel. Id. at 23 n.8.
" Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d at 1077 n.7,
states that "a conflict of interest does not violate the
right to effective assistance of counsel if it is irrelevant

or merely hypothetical." See United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
sub nom Moore v. United States, 423 U.S. 846 (1975).
One defendant was in a policy-making position and
the other was just a figurehead president in an
association involved in a mail-fraud scheme. The
appellant did not show how this supposed conflict
was resolved to his prejudice.
40 In some cases, both defendants may be harmed.
See Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973);
Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
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stances. For example, the Court in Glasser
specifically declined to inquire whether evidence to which an objection might have been
offered would have been admissible over objection.
Many subsequent decisions have not clearly
separated these three factors but have blurred
the distinctions between conflict and prejudice
and between' 42 the two implications of the term
"prejudice.

Semantic ambiguities make it dif-

ficult to estimate just how divergent the standards of the various jurisdictions really are.43
When a court says, as it did in United States v.
Gougis, 44 "there is no need on the part of a
defendant to show that he has been prejudiced,"4 5 it may imply that the conflict of inter-

ests need not actually have harmed the defendant, because the possibility of harm is sufficient,
or it may mean that the harmless error rule
should not be applied, or finally, it may indicate
that prejudice can be assumed because it is so
obvious or so likely to have occurred. In Gougis,
the prejudice was obvious. The most damaging
evidence against the defendant came from the
testimony of the co-defendant with whom he
shared counsel. In fact, in most cases, once a
convincing conflict is defined the separate analysis of conflict and prejudice seems unnecessary, precisely because it is so apparent which
defendant was affected. The court in Baker v,
4'Thus

prejudice, as used in connection with
the harmless error rule, need not be shown....
This approach is consistent with the rule that,
unlike many trial errors, denial of the right to
assistance of counsel calls for automatic reversal
of a conviction.
Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d at 1077 n.7.
4'An interesting example of the confusion between "conflict" and "prejudice" can be found in
Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1973),
where the court quotes from the South Dakota Supreme Court ruling in the case on review: "Under
these circumstances we cannot find that she has been
prejudiced and as to her at least, there was no
conflict of interest." The state court had previously
reversed the conviction of appellant's co-defendant
on the ground of conflict of interests, Austin is further
discussed in text following note 48 infra.
13 The author in 6 CRIM. L. BULL., supra note
10
at 443-44 observed the semantic difficulties of the
term "prejudice," which he found was variously used
as synonymous with conflict, as an inherent result of
conflict, or as a separate finding which must accompany conflict before a conviction will be reversed.
F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967).
44374
5
1Id.at 761.
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Wainwright4 was more explicit than most when
it said defendant "did not have to produce any
specific proof of prejudice resulting from this
' 47
conflict because prejudice is self-evident.
Perhaps the distinction between conflict and
prejudice only becomes important when both
defendants appeal but only one appears to
have been harmed by the inconsistent interests,
as happened in Glasser. Even in such cases,
however, some courts insist that Glasser requires
only a showing of conflict, with no burden of
proving harm to the defendant. In Austin v.
Erickson,48 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that a conflict which prejudiced one co-defendant had not been shown to
prejudice the other. The district court had said
"[S]ome prejudice must be shown even though
the amount of that prejudice need not be
shown." 49 The circuit court found this to be a
misreading of Glasser. But it went on to say,
"once the actual conflict has been established
which affected her own right to counsel's effective assistance, Austin had met her burden."50
In other words, while appearing to contradict
the district court in terms of the standard to be
applied, the court did speak of a conflict "which
affected her own right." This suggests the court
perceived actual harm to the defendant, perhaps in terms of the foreclosed defense of
shifting blame to her co-defendant. 5 '
Austin illustrates that even when a court expressly rejects the requirement of showing prejudice, it may implicitly find that the defendant
was disadvantaged by the joint representation.
To the extent the courts identify a conflict and
look for some evidence that the conflict adversely affected the defendant's interests, they
46422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970). Baker is discussed in text following note 89
infra.
47Id. at 148. See Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d
1211, 1219 (5th ir. 1975) where the attorney for two
brothers made.disparaging remarks about one at the
sentencing hearing in a successful effort to obtain
favorable sentencing for the other. The court said
"where the conflict is real ....a denial of the right
to effective representation exists, without a showing
of specific prejudice."
4 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973).
49
Id.at 625.
50Id.
" The court quotes from the dissenting opinion in
the state court decision, that it was "in appellant's
interest to point the finger of guilt" at her co-defendant. Id. at 625 n.4.

are conforming to the standard formulated in
Glasser. However, even if the court's inconsistent expressions of the standard can be reconciled, sometimes cases which seem to have
similar facts are not decided consistently. This
variation in outcome is arguably due to differences in the courts' perceptions of what actually
constitutes a conflict. Greater consistency in
appellate decisions can be expected as the
courts come to recognize and define certain
situations as posing inherent conflicts of interest.
SITUATIONS CONDUCIVE TO CONFLICTS

Defendants often appear to have similar interests and a common defense, yet inconsistencies may develop during the course of the trial.
A survey of the decisions which have found
conflicts reveals certain situations which are
particularly susceptible to divergent interests.
These situations can be broadly described as
those in which (1) a plausible defense is foreclosed, (2) one defendant is the "fall guy," (3)
only one defendant testifies, and (4) the defense attorney also represents, or has represented, a prosecution witness. The following
cases shed some light on what constitutes a
conflict of interests, how conflicts are analyzed,
and under what circumstances the courts assume that prejudice occurs.
Plausible Defense Foreclosed: Shifting Blame.
When one defendant is more implicated than
another in the common crime charged, efforts
to present a common defense may result in
foreclosing an alternative defense, usually the
opportunity to shift blame onto a co-defendant.52 This type of conflict is particularly difficult to review. The difficulty is inherent in the
fact that the record presents the defense as it
has been conducted, and while a failure to
52 An alleged opportunity to shift blame must be
supported by specific evidence. In United States v.
Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1406 (5th Cir. 1976), defendants claimed that joint representation foreclosed
counsel from exploiting possible differences in the
degree of their criminal intent, but advanced no
evidence to show lack of intent. The court in United
States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 284 (2d Cir. 1973)
found no evidence that any single defendant's position was unique. On the contrary:
[I]f the position of each on the key question of
guilty knowledge was substantially the same as
that of the others, as apparently was the case,
each might stand a better chance of acquittal by
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cross-examine a witness is a more or less apparent omission, a failure to develop a completely
different defense strategy will be less obvious
and seem more speculative. Cases of this kind
generally involve charges of constructive possession (as of drugs or stolen property), aiding
and abetting, or conspiracy, of which it has
been said that "the very53 nature of the charge
suggests disassociation.

The Fifth Circuit analyzed in Foxworth v.
Wainwright- the type of conflict posed by alternative defense theories. The court's review of
the record in Foxworth indicated that conflicting
testimony elicited during trial presented opportunities for shifting blame to one more directly
implicated, at the risk of sending him to the
electric chair. Four teenagers, prisoners at
Florida Industrial School at Marianna, were
convicted of murdering a boy who had been
found dead in the cell where nine boys were
confined together. The other four boys testified for the prosecution that the defendants
had held the victim down and choked him with
a stick. The defense claimed that the killing
had been accomplished by the four prosecution
witnesses, who used the stick to beat the victim
joining in one monolithic claim of ignorance
than by riding off in different directions.
The alternative defense must be one which would
have been adverse to the interests of a co-defendant,
otherwise it is merely a question of strategy. "Of
course, [defendant] might have tried a very different
line of defense under the guidance of separate counsel, but this is merely to say that one lawyer may try
a case quite differently from another." United States
v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1972).
" Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969). The
Supreme Court in Glasser noted the special risks of
multiple representation in cases where conspiracy is
charged.
In conspiracy cases, where the liberal rules of
evidence and the wide latitude accorded the
prosecution may, and sometimes do, operate
unfairly against an individual defendant, it is
especially important that he be given the benefit
of the undivided assistance of his counsel without the court's becoming a party to encumbering
that assistance.
Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76. But see United States v.
Gallagher, 437 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 1009 (1971) (the mere fact that evidence
against one is stronger does not indicate a conflict of
interest); United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970) (defendants
involved in completely different aspects of the conspiracy could not have implicated each other).
5 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975).
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on the head. Under this theory, termed by the
state the "united we stand, divided we fall"
approach, each defendant shared the same
interest in discrediting the prosecution witnesses, and the common defense did not appear to create conflicting interests. But, as the
court points out, a conflict existed in the initial
choice of defense strategies 5 which precluded
counsel from defending Foxworth by shifting
the responsibility to a co-defendant. Such a
strategy of shifting blame was really a plausible
alternative, since one 17-year-old co-defendant
was the oldest boy in the group and the evidence against him was more directly damaging.
The court also makes clear that the defendant
was prejudiced whether or not the alternative
defense would have succeeded.
If Foxworth's attorney had not been obliged to
try to save [co-defendants] and had attempted to
try to clarify these details through cross-examination, it is possible that the basis for the defense
we have discussed would have evaporated. Upon
closer questioning the witnesses might have recalled some participation by Foxworth in the
beating or motive on his part for the killing. We
do not believe, however, that petitioner must
show that his attorney's divided loyalties cost
him a directed verdict. Rather, if the record
shows that a plausible defense (one that might
have influenced twelve reasonable jurors) was
foreclosed because it might have prejudiced the
other defendants represented by the same appointed 56counsel, the conviction must be overturned .

According to the approach in Foxworth, a
defendant will be held to have been denied
effective assistance of counsel if the court perceives from the record an alternative defense
theory more favorable to appellant than the
strategy actually pursued, but which clearly
would have prejudiced at least one co-defendant by shifting to him more responsibility for
the criminal act. The alternative must be shown
to have been a plausible one, in light of the
circumstances and the divergent evidence presented, 57 but it is not necessary to inquire
55Id at 1079.
56

W

Id.

The alternative defense offered in United States

ex rel. Small v. Rundle, 442 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1971)
was not plausible. In a series of group sexual acts,
one defendant could hardly claim consent and shift

blame to the others for rape. In Larry Buffalo Chief
v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1970),
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whether it would have been a successful defense as the evidence was developed, since the
harmless error rule is not applicable.
Charges of constructive possession will often
present the possibility of a defense strategy of
shifting blame. The Third Circuit said in United
States ex rel. Hortav. DeYoung,58 that a possession
charge where contraband is found in the zone
of control of more than one person uniquely
requires individual counsel. 9 Appellant, her
husband, and a son-in-law had been defended
by single retained counsel on charges of maintaining and working for a lottery operation.
The district court had found no real possibility
of prejudice, but the appellate court held that
the record should have been examined to determine whether or not separate representation
might have made a difference in the choice of
defense strategy. Conflict in choice of strategy
became apparent when the record disclosed
that counsel failed in cross-examination to focus on appellant's absence from the store during key betting hours.60 Similarly, in McIver v.
United States, 6' a charge of possession of drugs
and paraphernalia required the Government
to show constructive possession, but the record
showed that defense counsel had failed to elicit
testimony from one defendant that he was in
the apaitment only temporarily. Such testimony would have tended to shift to the cowhether eye-witness' testimony created the opportunity to shift blame depended on whether the testimony (that three men in white shirts were fighting)
was reasonably consistent with defendant's appearance (Buffalo Chief wore a dark jacket, but unbuttoned, with white lining and a light shirt underneath). If there was no actual conflict in the evidence,
counsel's failure to cross-examine on the point could
not be attributed to a position of conflict with respect
to co-defendants.
58
523 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1975).
59
See also State v. Green, 129 N.J. Super. 157,
163, 322 A.2d 495, 498 (App. Div. 1974). The type of
case where-"[p]roof of guilt dep ends on establishing
that the narcotics were within the control of either
one or both of the defendants ... uniquely requires
undivided counsel." The drugs in this case had been
found in a car.
o See also United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport,
478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973),where an employee was
tried with his employers and three patrons on charges
of bookmaking and'lottery offenses. The plausible
defense of attributing origin and possession of certain
evidence to the employers was precluded because
the defendant shared" counsel retained and paid by
employers.
61 280 A.2d 527 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).

for domindefendant the entire responsibility
62
ion and control of the apartment.
The charge of aiding and abetting also
strongly suggests the possibility of the defense
of shifting blame. In Austin v. Erickson,6 the
court reversed Mrs. Austin's conviction -for
aiding and abetting in the killing of her infant
son because her counsel relied on the defense
of excusable homicide and failed to exploit the
opportunity to show that she could not prevent
the crime. Counsel simultaneously represented
her companion, Goode, who was separately
charged and tried for manslaughter. Goode
testified on behalf of Mrs. Austin at her, trial.
In considering Mrs. Austin's claim of ineffective representation, the Eighth Circuit found
she was prejudiced by a conflict of interests
despite the fact that she had the benefit of
Goode's exculpatory testimony. Separate counsel would have been in a position vigorously to
exploit the occasion to cast blame on the companion alone.6
The Fall Guy: Deflecting Blame. The trial of
Mrs. Austin's companion 65 illustrates another
type of conflict situation. In some cases, instead
of foregoing the defense of shifting blame to
another, the defendant tries to exculpate codefendants by testifying for them. But he deflects from them at the risk of prejudice to his
own interests. He may unnecessarily incriminate himself by his testimony or, if he pleads
guilty and then testifies, he may risk a heavier
sentence. These voluntary attempts to protect
a co-defendant frequently occur in family and
62 The court in this circumstance somehow found
indications of prejudice as to both defendants.
6 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973).
The court did note that separate counsel would
undoubtedly have advised the companion to exercise
his fifth amendment rights. But this did not change
the fact that Austin's interest was to cast all the
blame on Goode. Id. at 625 n.4. See also Craig v.
United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954). Two key
witnesses were not effectively cross-examined on behalf of one defendant charged with aiding in the
preparation of documents for the Internal Revenue
Service, where it was in the interest of his employer
co-defendant to shift responsibility for fraudulent
documents to his employees. But see People v. Gonzalez, 30 N.Y. 2d 28, 280 N.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 859 (1972), which held that assault charges of
acting in concert and of aiding and abetting were
defended without conflict on the theory that one
acted in self-defense and the other simply went to
his aid.
State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 171 N.W.2d 733
(1969).
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close friend situations. 66 Goode, for example,
was an intimate friend of Mrs. Austin, and at
her trial offered testimony favorable to her
defense. His testimony was then used at his
own trial to convict him of first degree manslaughter of Mrs. Austin's infant child. The
state supreme court reversed his conviction on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel,
saying "[h]is testimony could serve but one
purpose-to deflect 7 the glare of guilt away
from [the mother]."

6

A defendant may also take the blame against
his will or without being consulted, clearly to
the prejudice of his own interests.
No one should be represented by an attorney
who is making him the "fall guy" by design. To
hold otherwise would open the door to many
abuses going to the essentials of a fair trial.68
In United States v. Truglio,61 the defendant was
induced to plead guilty in order to keep codefendants from going to prison, pursuant to
a package deal negotiated with the United
States Attorney. The Fourth Circuit found that
coercion resulted from the multiple representation and the nature of the proposed bargain.
A similar case is Horowitz v. Henderson,7 where

the retained counsel of co-defendant Williford
was appointed to represent Horowitz, who
eventually decided to plead guilty to a charge
of distribution of drugs. Despite prior drugrelated experiences, Horowitz testified to exculpate Williford. He was sentenced to the
maximum penalty, although he had no serious
record of criminal convictions. The appellate
court held that joint representation restrained
counsel from pursuing the single aim of incurring the least possible penalty for Horowitz.
One Defendant Testifies. When both jointly
represented defendants take the stand, offering reasonably consistent testimony, the courts
have usually rejected a subsequent claim of
conflict of interests. 7 1 When neither defendant
66 See, e.g., United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448
(2d Cir. 1973) (the Government argued that the
common defense strategy was for one of two close
friends to take all the blame); United States v. Pinc,
452 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1971) (a husband and wife
each made admissions exonerating the other).
67 84 S.D. at 374, 171 N.W.2d at 735.
68 United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 454 (2d
Cir. 1973).
6

493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974).

514 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1975).
7'See United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
70
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testifies, a conflict is also difficult to prove. 72
But if one defendant testifies and his co-defendant does not, there is the risk of an inherent conflict of interests in the appearance of
unequal treatment.
[T]he possibility of a conflict of interest is present
especially where there is a question as to whether
either or both of the defendants should take the
stand.... And if ...

one defendant elects to

take the stand and the other chooses not to, the
possible prejudice in the eyes of the jury to the
defendant who does not take the stand is almost
inescapable. 3
When one defendant takes the stand, and
his testimony actually incriminates his co-defendant, common representation is obviously
inconsistent because the attorney is not in a
position to cross-examine one client on behalf
of the other.7 4 In some cases, the decision
Cir. 1972) (testimony of both was mutually exculpatory and consistent; for one to inculpate the other or
try to impeach the credibility of a corroborating
witness would have been ill-advised); Holloway v,
State, 539 S.W. 2d 435 (Ark. 1976) (all three rapemurder defendants took the stand, against advice of
counsel, and denied any involvement in the crime;
none of the defendapts tried to incriminate others).
But see Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), where both defendants testified although
one of them had a criminal record which could be
used against him on cross-examination. The reviewing court felt the decision to have both defendants
testify was unnecessary and was due only to the fact
of joint representation. "[T]he attorney with both
defendant's interests at stake may have been motivated to call both simply to appear evenhanded in
his treatment of each of his clients." Id. at 247.
72 See United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.
1972) (failure of both defendants to take the stand
was insufficient to demonstrate prejudice; impossible
to tell from the record why such a strategy was
followed); United States v. Luciano, 343 F.2d 172
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945 (1965) (failure of
retained counsel to seek severance evinces a trial
strategy of presenting a common front; where neither defendant testified, the prosecutor cannot elicit
evidence of one against the other).
" United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d at 453.
'4 See Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th
Cir. 1972) (prior statement by testifying defendant
implicated co-defendant in another crime; common
counsel could not effectively cross-examine); United
States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967) (some
of the most damaging evidence against defendant
came from his co-defendant; joint counsel could not
cross-examine); Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th
Cir. 1966) (confession by defendant indirectly implicated his co-defendant). In People v. Martin, 38 Ill.
App. 3d 209, 347 N.E.2d 200 (1976) the court held

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

whether or not to testify may itself pose a
conflict of interests if, for instance, a defendant
is inhibited by prior criminal activity which can
75
be used to impeach him on cross-examination.
If the defendant testifies on behalf of his codefendants and by taking the stand exposes
himself to impeachment, he is prejudiced by
the joint representation. 76 On the other hand,
if the defendant does not testify because of
risks to his co-defendants although taking the
stand would be in his own best interests, he is
also prejudiced .77
Sometimes when a defendant refuses to take
the stand, a co-defendant may attempt to claim
prejudice by asserting that he would have benefited from the testimony. In such a case, the
courts require some indication of what favorable testimony would have been offered absent
the alleged conflict. 7 For example, in Davidson
v. Cupp, 79 a claim that the attorney should
have called a co-defendant to testify was rejected because the co-defendant said that she
woud have pleaded the fifth amendment and
that in any case her testimony would not have

that a rape defendant was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his attorney was not in a position
to cross-examine or discredit a jointly represented
co-defendant when he took the stand and tried to
explain having written a letter to a key prosecution
witness asking him to change his testimony. But see
Burston v. Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975), where although a defendant implicated his co-defendant in a misdemeanor,
the joint representation was held not to be prejudicial, since co-defendants had the same interest in
defeating a capital charge.
' See Lollar v. United States, discussed in note 71
supra.
71 See Horowitz v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 740 (5th
Cir. 1975) (exculpatory testimony exposed defendant
to cross-examination about the extent of his drugrelated experiences).
7 In Alvarez v. Wainwright, 522 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.
1975), defendant was advised to refuse an offer for a
light sentence in exchange for testimony for the
prosecution, He was also advised not to testify at
trial because of a prior statement which was harmful
to co-defendants, although exculpatory as to him.
78 United States v. Pinc, 452 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1971) held there was prejudice to the husband when
counsel could not ethically call the wife to testify to
affirm her previous confession exonerating the husband. The court noted that the confession gave some
indication of what she would have testified to, and
that an actual offer of proof was precluded by counsel's ehtical obligations to a former client.
7 446 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1971).

been beneficial to the defendant. In United
States v. Lovano, 0 prejudice was claimed because counsel could not have cross-examined,
had he testified, a co-defendant who pleaded
guilty. But the potential problem never arose,
since the co-defendant did not testify. In this
case, the court rejected the claim that the multiple representation influenced the decision not
to take the stand. According to the court, appellant had alleged only a theoretical conflict of
interests "based on mere speculation."8' There
was no indication in the record that the codefendant would have agreed8 2to testify or what
he would have said if he had.

Conflicting considerations are likely to
hinder the decision whether to testify when
one defendant has made a pre-trial admission
implicating his co-defendants. Conflict of interest has been argued as an aspect of a claim of
s
Bruton error. Bruton v. United States,~
concerned a post-arrest confession in a conspiracy
case, admissible against one defendant as a
party admission but inadmissible against his
co-defendant because the conspiracy had
ended. The Supreme Court held that where
such a confession implicates a co-defendant
who cannot cross-examine the speaker because
the latter does not take the stand, there is a
violation of the sixth amendment right of confrontation.84

A Bruton error can be cured if the confessing
defendant takes the stand and is subject to
cross-examination by co-defendant's attorney
whether or not Re is in fact cross-examined.
The Constitutop as construed in Bruton ... is

violated only Ahere the out-of-court heresay
statement is that.?f a declarant who is unavailable
at the trial for "f11 and effective" cross-examination.85
80420 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1970).
81

Id.at 774.
s2Accord, Fields v. United States, 408 F.2d 885 (5th
Cir. 1969) (value of testimony speculative); Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969) ("subjective speculation"
in no way supported by the record.)
s319 U.S. 123 (1968).
s4The rationale for the Bruton decision is that
limiting instructions on the use of the evidence will
not be followed by the jury. Where the statement is
admissible against both defendants no Bruton situation arises. There is also no error where the statement
refers to the co-defendant but is not inculpatory or
accusatory.
8I Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627 (1971).
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If declarant and co-defendant share the same
counsel, of course, full and effective cross-examination of one on behalf of the other is not
possible.8 6 But since jointly represented de-

fendants usually present a common defense,
the question is more likely to be whether the
defendant who testifies is truly an adverse
witness," for if he denies the pre-trial statement, his testimony is in fact favorable to the
co-defendant.88
However, while there is no Bruton error when
the declarant denies his confession, the decision
whether or not to testify may itself be affected
by a conflict of interests. In Baker v. Wainwright,85 Baker and Damron, jointly represented by court-appointed counsel, were tried
and convicted of robbery and kidnapping. Evidence of Damron's pre-trial confession was
admitted, with instructions to the jury that the
confession could not be considered as evidence
against Baker. Damron took the stand and
denied that he had confessed. On these facts,
Baker was not denied the right of confrontation
86 See Courtney v. United States, 486 F.2d 1108,
1110 (9th Cir. 1973) where jointly represented codefendants were charged with obstruction of justice.
The court notes that a common attorney is of course
in no position to cross-examine and impeach his own
witness and client. In this case, however, the codefendant's testimony did not contradict defendant's
testimony
in "any of its essentials."
87
Bruton error was claimed but rejected in United
States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976), on the grounds that
co-defendant's prior statement did not actually implicate Valenzuela, but even if it did, any Bruton error
was cured when the co-defendant took the stand to
deny making the statement.
88 See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. at 629, where the
Court held that counsel's failure to cross-examine
could not be contrued as a denial of the sixth amendment right to confront an adverse witness.
[O]nce Runnels had testified that the statement
was false, it could hardly have profited the
respondent for his counsel through cross-examination to try to shake that testimony....
[G]iven a joint trial and a common defense,
Runnel's testimony respecting his alleged outof-court statement was more favorable to the
respondent than any that cross-examination by
counsel could possibly have produced, had Runnels "affirmed the statement as his." It would
be unrealistic in the extreme . . . to hold that
the respondent was denied either the opportunity or the benefit of full and effective crossexamination....
89 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970).
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which constitutes a Bruton error. 0 The court
held, however, that Baker was prejudiced by a
conflict of interests. Because of the operation
of the Bruton rule, counsel faced a dilemma.9 1
If Damron did not testify, a conviction of Baker
could be overturned.on the ground of Bruton
error, but Damron would then have lost the
opportunity to exculpate himself.
When a defense counsel has it within his power
to void a proceeding against his client and,
because of his representation of another is not
completely free to exercise this power, he most
assuredly has a directly conflicting interest.
When he resolved this conflict in favor of putting
2
Damron on the stand, Baker was prejudiced.
A similar conflict developed in United States
v. Gaines.93 Gaines confessed to the robbery of
an armored truck and implicated two others,
one of whom he said had killed the driver. He
agreed to testify for the prosecution in return
for a lesser charge. Later, however, he denied
his confession. It appeared that the attorney
for the other two defendants was by this time
also representing Gaines. At trial, Gaines took
the stand to deny involvement in the crime,
and in particular to repudiate his confession.
The prosecution was then able to impeach
Gaines' testimony by using his confession including statements incriminating the co-defendants. When the jury could not reach a
verdict, a mistrial was declared and a second
trial proceeded with the same counsel and
parties. Gaines this time did not testify. His
confession, inadmissible against his two co-defendants, could only be introduced in evidence
redacted to exclude any references to them.
By not testifying, Gaines thus avoided implicating his co-defendants but, on the other hand,
he did not have the opportunity to deny the
evidence of his prior admissions. All three
defendants were convicted of robbery and
90Id. at 148.

9i Actually, counsel was not aware of the conflict
at the time of trial, which preceded Bruton. Baker
considers the impact of Bruton's retroactive application, announced in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293
(1968).
9 422 F.2d at 148. The court adds that if counsel
had kept Damron off the stand in order to give
Baker the best possible case, then Damron would
have been prejudiced by the conflict. Id. at 148-49
n.12.
93 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976).
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murder. On appeal, Gaines' conviction was
reversed on the ground that the conflict between his interests and those of his co-defendants was resolved to his prejudice at the second
trial.94
Representation of a Prosecution Witness. When

it appears that defense counsel has acted as
attorney for a prosecution witness, there is a
serious issue of inconsistent interests which may
deprive the defendant of effective representation. The threshold question in these cases is
whether the relationship between attorney and
adverse witness still exists at the time of trial.
In some cases the witness is actually the victim
of the crime which is the subject of the trial,95
and is being represented in a civil matter by
defense counsel or his firm.96 In other cases,
defense counsel simultaneously represents the
witness in an unrelated criminal case. 9 7 But
whatever the type of representation, "counsel
is placed in the equivocal position of having to
cross-examine his own client as an adverse
witness.""

The inconsistent interests involved in the
simultaneous representation of defendant and
witness are so self-evident, and prejudice to
the defendant is so likely to occur, that courts
94Id. at 1044-45. The court found that despite an
initial warning about potential conflicts, Gaines had
not waived his rights at the second trial.
" "The victim of a crime is not a detached observer
of the trial of the accused, and his 'private attorney'
is likely to be restrained in the handling of that
client/witness." Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245
(5th Cir. 1974). See Zurita v. United States, 410 F.2d
477 (7th Cir. 1969) (robbed bank); United States ex
rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(burglarized victim); People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109,
239 N.E.2d 441 (1968) (robbed jewelry store).
96 Commonwealth v. Geraway, 364 Mass. 168, 301
N.E.2d 814 (1973) reversed conviction where four of
the eight witnesses against the defendant were represented by defense counsel's firm, although counsel
lacked knowledge of this, defended vigorously, and
there was no evidence of prejudice.
97 See United States ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee,
282 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. N.Y. 1968). The scope of
cross-examination might be restricted by counsel having received confidential information or by his reluctance to impeach the witness.
The knowledge that [the witness] has a felony
charge pending against him might have reduced
[attorney's] zeal in cross-examining him, one of
his clients- favorable treatment [in his own case]
could not be expected if he were proven to be a
liar.
Id. at 971.
98 Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d at 1245.

have rarely required a specific showing of prejudice .99
We need not inquire into those allegations [of
specific instances of prejudice]. When there is a
conflict of interest such as exists in this case, tle
prejudice may be subtle, even unconscious. It
may elude detection on review. A reviewing
court deals with a cold record . . . often giving
no clue to the erosion of zeal which may ensue
from divided loyalty. Accordingly, where the
conflict is real, as it is here, a denial of the right
to effective representation exists, without a
showing of prejudice.'00

Defendants in such cases risk, to a greater
extent than do jointly represented co-defendants, the effects of an often undetectable "erosion of zeal." The defendant also gains no
advantage in this situation comparable to the
possible benefits of joint representation.
Therefore, rather than require the defendant
to point to specific instances during the trial
when the attorney did not act in his best interests, the courts have chosen to presume prejudice.
This situation is too [sic] fraught with the danger
of prejudice, prejudice which the cold record
might not indicate, that the mere existence of
the conflict is sufficient to constitute a violation
of [defendant's] rights whether or not it in fact
influences the attorney or the outcome of the
case. 01

Prejudice is not presumed, however, in cases
in which the defense attorney has merely represented a prosecution witness on some former
occasion. 102 The courts have required the de" "A showing of actual prejudice is not required;
all that is necessary is a showing of a conflict." United
States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. at 57.
Accord, United States ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee,
282 F. Supp. at 57. See also Zurita v. United States,
410 F.2d at 480. The court in Commonwealth v.
Geraway, 364 Mass. at 174, 301 N.E.2d at 817-18,
reversed the defendant's conviction under its supervisory powers, since the court did not feel certain
whether or not a sixth amendment violation required
a showing of prejudice.
"0 Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d at 1245. The court
in this case held that the defendant had been deprived of effective representation of counsel as a
matter of law.
'01 United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F.
Supp. at 57. Accord, People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d at
113, 239 N.E.2d at 444: "It is unfair to the accused,
for who can determine whether his representation
was affected, at least, subliminally, by the conflict."
102 See, e.g., United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d
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fendant in this situation to show that an actual
conflict hindered the defense. United States v.
Jeffers10 3 considers the issues raised by claims of
conflict of interests arising from prior representation of a witness. The court in Jeffers
looked to all the circumstances to determine
whether counsel was inhibited in the conduct
of cross-examination by such considerations as
an interest in future business with the former
client. The court noted that confidential information about the witness could also be a factor
creating conflict. Counsel might possess information which could ordinarily be useful to
impeach the witness, but which is privileged.'
Assuming that counsel will normally "treat
privileged information with appropriate respect,"105 the court indicated that there is
nevertheless some risk that "counsel may overcompensate and fail to cross-examine fully for
fear of misusing his confidential information;
he might thereby fail to inquire into legitimate
areas of concern.'

06

However, when counsel

in the Jeffers case sought to withdraw because
his law partner had previously represented the
Government witness, the trial court denied his
request. The appellate court agreed that "a
07

disabling conflict did not exist."'1

There was

no indication of any important pecuniary interest in future representation of the adverse
witness, and there was nothing in the record,
beyond the attorney's repeated bare assertions,
505 (1st Cir. 1973) (no indication of divided loyalties
at time of trial); United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d
878 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973)

(witness having already served his sentence, there
was no interest of his that counsel had to protect by
compromising defendant); United States ex rel. Kachinski v. Cavell, 453 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1971) (vigorous
cross-examination; nothing to show the relationship
continued); Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1968) (defendant made no specific showing
of prejudice).
103520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423
U.S. 1066 (1976).
,01Id. at 1265. The court notes, however, that it is
the witness himself who must then object to the
cross-examination. See United States v. Rispo, 460
F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1972) (the witness waived the

attorney-client privilege by disclosing to the prosecution his participation in the offense); Olshen v.
McMann, 378 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 874 (1967) (witness waived privilege by disclosure).
105520 F.2d at 1265.

106Id.
07

'

1d. at 1263.
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to show that he was inhibited in his questioning
of the witness by any relevant confidential
information.1is Furthermore, the court indicated that possession of privileged information
will rarely be sufficient to support a claim of
conflict of interests.? 9
[I]f defense counsel was concerned that he might
be using confidential information improperly,

he could have outlined the nature of the information to the judge and, if necessary, made an

in camera disclosure to him. On the basis of such
a disclosure it might have become apparent that
the privilege was either inapplicable or had been
waived by the witness. Or, it might have been
clear that the information was not usable for
other evidentiary reasons." 0
Even if the information was privileged an4
could not be used for that reason, the defendant would not be prejudiced by this omission.
If he had been represented by an attorney wh8
did not have access to the confidential infor:
mation, that attorney could have made no use
of it either.'

It is also difficult to claim a conflict of interests when the defendant is fully aware of the
relationship between his retained attorney and
a key prosecution witness.112 In United States v.
James,"' the defendant was a pimp who sent
one of his girls across state lines to engage in
prostitution and beat her when she returned
with insufficient proceeds. The defendant had
previously engaged his attorney to defend the
girl on prostitution charges. She testified
against defendant at his trial, but the court
rejected a subsequent claim of sixth amendment violation. Defendant "cannot now, after
108See also People v. Anderson, 59 Cal. App. 3d
831, 131 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1976) (no offer of proof to
show conflict).
109
It would seem, however, that if the confidential
information relates to the case on trial, counsel could
be seriously inhibited from thoroughly questioning
the witness.
110
520 F.2d at 1265.

"1
"2

Id. at 1265-66.
See State v. Cox, 539 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1976) (no deprivation of constitutional rights if
the defendant knowingly consents to representation
by an attorney who also represents a prosecution
witness. There is no consent, however, if the defendant discovers the fact after trial has started.)
"1 505 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1000 (1975).
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knowingly completing trial with
such counsel,
1 14
urge that he was prejudiced.
Occasionally there is a question as to whether
or not counsel's representation of the witness
has terminated. Decisions which apparently depart from the practice of presuming conflict
and prejudice when there is simultaneous representation of defendant and adverse witness
usually indicate that there was no substantial
continuation of the attorney's relationship with
the witness. In United States ex rel. Kachinski v.
Cavell"5 the attorney-client relationship with
the witness was considered to be effectively
terminated at the time of defendant's trial,
although there was some overlap in representation of the witness and the defendant. The
witness had been charged and sentenced the
previous summer, but the attorney remained
formally counsel of record until the witness
was paroled. In Hayman v. United States"6 the
court found no conflict where defense counsel
was also the attorney for the prosecution witness who had pleaded guilty on the same
charge, since there was no indication that counsel conducted a less than thorough cross-examination. But it is significant that although counsel was attorney of record for the witness, she
had expressed dissatisfaction with him and
given every indication that she was acting on
her own when she decided to enter a plea of
17
guilty.
The foregoing cases show the types of situations in which inconsistent interests have frequently developed. Any relationship between
defense counsel and adverse witnesses of
course raises questions of loyalty. As between
co-defendants, when one defendant is less implicated in the crime charged than are the
others, common representation is apt to prejudice his interest in extricating himself. Or when
members of a family, or close friends, are
jointly represented there is a risk that one will
attempt to take most of the blame. If there are
considerations indicating that only one defendant will testify, this raises questions of prejudice
to his co-defendants. Since these situations pose
special risks, they should indicate to the trial
14 Id. at 900. There was no actual showing of
prejudice to the defendant.
11 453 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1971).
16 205 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 349
U.S.7 959 (1955).
1 Id. at 893.

judge the necessity for investigating whether
multiple representation is in fact appropriate
in the particular case.
DUTY OF THE COURT TO INQUIRE INTO
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

The great likelihood of inconsistent interests
developing when defendants share counsel has
drawn attention to the obligation of trial judges
to anticipate conflicts. The Supreme Court has
never specifically addressed the issue"' and
there is considerable disagreement about the
extent to which the judge has a duty to determine before trial whether the existence of potential conflicts requires appointment of separate counsel"19 or, in the case of retained counsel, necessitates warning defendants of the hazards of joint representation. The American
Bar Association has recommended that the
judge make an affirmative inquiry into potential conflicts in every case of joint representation.1 20 Such a pre-trial determination of incon1s In Glasser, the judge had been warned of the
possibility of inconsistent interests, and had a duty
under the circumstances not to impose joint representation on the defendants. See text accompanying
note 17 supra. However, in the same way that a bare
allegation of conflict is insufficient to reverse a conviction, an unsupported suggestion of potential conflict is not usually held to mandate appointment of
separate counsel. In United States v. Williams, 429
F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1970), appointed counsel informed
the court of "possible conflicts of interest" in the
future, but had no present indication of any conflict
either from defendants or from the evidence. The
court declined to appoint another attorney on the
basis of a "bald and conclusory statement." The court
held in State v. Alexander, 334 So. 2d 388, (La. 1976)
that "mere assertion that separate counsel is needed
is insufficient. Specific facts must be presented to
the trial judge to show that antagonism or conflict
between the defenses does in fact exist."
'19 The federal courts have a statutory duty under
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to appoint separate
counsel in situations of conflict:
[The court shall appoint separate counsel for
defendants who have such conflicting interests
that they cannot properly be represented by the
same counsel, or when other good cause is
shown.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (b).
120 Whenever two or more defendants who have
been jointly charged, or whose cases have been
consolidated, are represented by the same attorney, the trial judge should inquire into potential
conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each
defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.
ABA STANDARDS, THE FUNCTION OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE, § 3.4 (b) (Draft, 1972)
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sistent interests would apparently safeguard
constitutional rights and prevent wasteful retrials. Most courts have been reluctant, however, to make a pre-trial hearing mandatory.
As the Seventh Circuit recently pointed out, an
affirmative inquiry is not required by the sixth
amendment or by Glasser. 2 A substantial investigation by the judge into the facts might itself
raise constitutional problems. For example, it
might encroach on an accused's fifth amendment protections against self-incrimination .122
The suggestion has also been made that a
substantive inquiry would actually interfere
with the sixth amendment right to counsel
which it seeks to protect by impairing defense
strategy and compelling disclosure of confidential information .'2

In order to avoid the problems which a
mandatory judicial inquiry might create, primary responsibility for determining potential
conflicts and bringing them to the attention of
the court could remain with counsel. The
American Bar Association strongly advises
against

multiple

1 24

representation,

and

the

Code of Professional Responsibility requires an
attorney to decline representation of clients
with differing interests unless he makes full
disclosure of the risks to his clients, obtains
United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
122 United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935 (1967), discussed
in text following note 149 infra.
'23 This problem was suggested in Judge Moore's
dissenting opinion in United States v. DeBerry, 487
F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1973):
[A] preliminary examination by the trial court
of counsel and their clients as to the possibility
121

of conflict ...

would,... to be effective, neces-

sitate a full disclosure by defense counsel of
counsel's defense plans and strategy [creating] a
possible interference with defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights.
124 The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for
more than one of several co-defendants except
in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to
develop and when the several defendants give
an informed consent to such multiple representation. In some instances, as defined in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, accepting
or continuing employment by more than one
defendant in the same criminal case will constitute unprofessional conduct.
ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §3.5
(b) (1971).
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their consent, and can adequately represent the
interest of each.12 5 But while reliance on the

attorney's ethical standards and on his judgment would seem to eliminate the problems
involved in a pre-trial hearing, it is not clear
that such reliance substantially reduces reversals on appeal. The defendant is not presumed
to have waived his right to effective assistance
of counsel simply because, as often happens,
his attorney does not allege conflict or even
asserts that there are no inconsistent interests ' 2 6 Furthermore, even the courts which

have chosen to rely primarily on counsel's judgment do so only in cases of privately retained
counsel .127 Thus the problem of a judge's duty
to foresee potential conflicts arises in many
cases even in jurisdictions which prefer when
possible to rely on counsel's judgment.
The question of whether the trial judge has
in (A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a cli-

ent will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered
employment, or if it would be likely to in-

volve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5&105 (C).

(C) [A] lawyer may represent multiple clients
if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full

disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1974)
DR5-105 (A), (C).
126 Glasser disapproved implicit waiver of effective
representation. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
Recent cases have required a very exacting standard
of knowing, on-the-record waiver, even where conflicting interests were apparent at the outset. See
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198 (D.D.C.
1972). But see Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota,
425 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1970) which may suggest that
retainingjoint counsel when inconsistent interests are
foreseeable would constitute waiver of effective representation. In a case where defendant dismissed
court appointed counsel and retained the attorney
who was representing his co-defendants, the Eighth
Circuit said the right to adequate assistance of counsel
was not necessarily waived by this choice if the conflict
was not known at the outset. But the fact that the
state had not imposed ineffective counsel could be
considered as afactor in the issue of waiver. 425 F.2d
at 279 n.5.
127 See note 152 and discussion accompanying note
164 infra.
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an obligation to inquire into potential conflicts
and to warn defendants of the hazards of joint
representation has raised the issue of who will
bear the burden of proving conflicts on appeal
when the judge makes no pre-trial determination. Opposite rules have been announced by
the District of Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. In 1967, the District of Columbia
Circuit adopted as a rule that in the absence of
a pre-trial determination of defendant's affirmative knowing choice for joint counsel, the
burden shifts to the government to prove that
no prejudice resulted from the multiple representation. 28 The Seventh Circuit in 1975 explicitly rejected this approach, and, prefering to
rely on counsel to detect conflicts, held that
defendants must demonstrate "with a reasonable degree of specificity" that an actual conflict
existed at trial whether or not the judge made
an affirmative pre-trial inquiry. 29 A middle
position has recently been formulated by the
Second Circuit, which requires shifting the
burden of proof where the court has failed to
make a pre-trial inquiry, but only when a
possible conflict has been brought to the attention of the trialjudge. 30
The District of Columbia Circuit has taken
the position that whether the trial court appoints counsel or the defendants retain their
own attorney, the judge has an obligation to
ensure that the defendants are aware of the
risks of joint representation. Campbell v. United
States131 pointed out that when defendants have
chosen a single attorney, the "trial judge has a
responsibility to assure that co-defendants' decisions to proceed with one attorney is an
informed decision." The judge must make a
determination that defendants have been
properly apprised of the risks.
Considerations of efficient judicial administration as well as important rights of defendants
are served when the trial judge makes the affirmative determination that co-defendants have intelligently chosen to be represented by the same
attorney and that their decision was not gov12 Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C.
1967); Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C.
1967).
129 United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
130United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d
1973).
131352 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

Cir.
Cir.
Cir.
Cir.

erned by poverty and lack of information
on the
32

availability of assigned counsel.1

In Lollar v. United States' Judge Skelly Wright
held that the court has the same obligation to
inform defendants when it appoints counsel:
Certainly, whatever risks and disabilities inhere
in joint representation inhere whether counsel is
appointed or retained; and whatever steps a
defendant is entitled to take to avoid such problems should be made known to him whatever his
economic situation may be."

Lollar based its rule on Glasser's admonition to
the trial judge to guard the essential rights of
the accused and to determine whether there
has been an intelligent and competent waiver
of the right to counsel. Since the accussed
themselves are usually not in a position to
appreciate and evaluate potential conflicts, the
burden is on the judge to make them fully
aware of the problems. Lollar did not directly
discuss the question of how the judge is to
determine whether there are substantial conflicts, or to what extent he may inquire into
details of the proposed defense, but in Ford v.
United States,13' a subsequent case involving
Lollar's co-defendant, Judge Wright apparently felt that the burden of a pre-trial determination is such that the judge should always
initially appoint separate counsel. 3 6 Then, if
"the interests of justice and of the clients"
would be served by joint representation, counsel can suggest this for the court's consideration.137 In all cases which proceed with common
representation, appropriate warnings by the
court and a knowing, intelligent waiver by the
defendants must appear on the record."'
32
1 Id. at 360.
1- 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
13 Id. at 246.
1-3 6 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
'
Id. at 125-26. This rule requiring initial appointment of separate counsel seems to be based on the

court's supervisory powers. There is clearly no constitutional right to separate counsel except when
there are conflicts of interest. However, Judge
Wright raises the possibility of a constitutional issue
if the indigent's access to separate counsel is made to
depend on the court's ability before trial to predict
prejudice. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d at 246
n.6, citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"1 379 F.2d at 126.
138The question whether a defendant can always
waive his right to conflict-free representation seems
to be left open. Ford suggests that it may still be for
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Otherwise, the burden will be on the government to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the denial of the defendants' right is merely
harmless error. 39
The First Circuit announced a similar rule in
United States v. Foster.140 The trial court has a
duty to comment on the risks ofjoint representation, to inform defendants that they may
retain or be appointed separate counsel, and
to "inquire diligently whether [defendants]
have discussed the risks with their attorney.'

14 1

This procedure apparently does not constitute
a waiver, but it increases the defendant's burden of proof on appeal.
If the court has carried out this duty of inquiry, then to the extent a defendant later attempts to attack his conviction on grounds of
conflict of interest arising from joint representation he will bear a heavy burden indeed of
persuading us that he42 was, for that reason,
deprived of a fair trial.1

Where the record does not show that a satisfactory inquiry was made, the burden of proof
shifts to the government to show that prejudice
was improbable.

43

The First Circuit declines to

follow the District of Columbia Circuit requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
which it considers equivalent to a rule of automatic reversal. It also does not require appointment of separate counsel in every case, but
defendants must be made aware of the risks of
sharing counsel and offered the opportunity to
have separate counsel appointed, apparently
without any showing of probable conflict.
In United States v. Mandell,'44a case involving

retained counsel, the Seventh Circuit found an
adequate safeguard for defendants' sixth
amendment rights in the duty of members of
the court to decide whether multiple representation
is appropriate, despite a waiver. Id. at 126. See also
United States v. Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198 (D.D.C.
1972) where the district court considers not only
evidence of intelligent choice of multiple representation, but also evidence that conflicts are not likely to
develop. See discussion of possible limitations on
waiver in text following note 189 infra.
19 Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d at 247; Ford v.
United States, 379 F.2d at 125.
14' 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972).
141Id.

Id.
Id.
144525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976).
142

143
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the bar to inform clients of potential dangers. 145
Although it would not discourage the practice
by district court judges of making an affirmative inquiry, 146 the court declined to adopt a

mandatory rule, and held that defendants had
the burden of showing "with a reasonable degree of specificity, that 47a conflict of interests
1
actually existed at trial.'

In placing the "primary responsibility for the
ascertainment and avoidance of conflict situations" on counsel,14 the court quoted with
approval the views of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Paz-Sierra.49 The Paz-Sierra
court felt that the disadvantages of requiring
the trial judge to make an affirmative determination included the serious fifth amendment
problems raised by the necessity for hearing
from each defendant before trial his version of
the facts. In addition, a pre-trial finding that
no prejudice was likely to occur by reason of
the joint representation would on appeal work
against the defendant who may in fact have
been prejudiced. Relying on counsel seemed
the better choice.
No facts have thus far been presented that the
Bar of this country is so unmindful of the canons of ethics and its obligations to avoid positions of conflict as to call for a pre-trial crossexamination of defendants and their counsel on
the theory, or even presumptuous presumption,
that counsel will not be faithful to the best
145 525 F.2d at 677. See note 125 supra. In United
States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988,
993 (7th Cir. 1975) the court relied on the, fact that
counsel had perceived no disabling conflict when he
advised one of three clients to plead guilty. Counsel's
determination that Robinson had no viable defense
was accepted, and the fact that had Robinson gone
to trial he would have prejudiced his co-defendants
did not state a conflict since severance would have
been available.
146 525 F.2d at 677 & n.10.
147Id. at 677. In Mandell the defendants, an attorney and two conspirators who had persuaded an
associate to invest in fictitious personal injury judgments against the City of Chicago, failed to sustain
their burden of proof by merely claiming from differing degrees of guilt. The court found no inconsistency in the defense and no support in the record
for the suggestion that only one of the three was
vigorously
defended.
48
1 Id.
149 367 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386
U.S. 935 (1967). In a bench trial, two brothers were
convicted of selling cocaine. Since each agreed that
one had not participated in the sale of drugs to a
federal agent, the court found no conflict of interests.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
interests of their clients and when aware of any
conflict of interest between clients jointly represented whether before or during trial will not
disclose it to the court and seek appropriate
relief. 150
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the practice
of relying on counsel to call the court's attention
to the presence of conflicts, in preference to
requiring in all cases an affirmative inquiry by
the trial judge. 5 1 Since the court has no duty
to ascertain potential conflicts, there is no question of shifting the burden of proof to the
government on appeal where no inquiry was
made at trial.
Mandell was a case of privately retained counsel. There are suggestions in other Seventh
Circuit cases that the judge may have a greater
obligation when joint counsel is appointed by
the court,'1 52 and when the court has notice of
possible conflicts. 1 53 The position of the Seventh Circuit is not yet clear as to whether in
such cases the trial court's duty to inquire is
mandatory and will affect the burden of proof.
The court in Mandell declined to exercise its
inherent supervisory authority "at this time" as
a basis for announcing a mandatory rule.'5 It
purported in this respect to join the Third
Circuit, which found it unnecessary to adopt
the rule in a case where the conviction was
reversible on grounds of actual conflict. 55 Both
the Seventh and Third Circuits have thus exISOId. at 932-33.
" United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d at 677.
Accord, Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839, 897 (1967) (conflict said to be contingent on possibility of ajury trial):
[T]he trial court must be able, and be freely
permitted, to rely upon counsel's representations that the possibility of such a conflict does
or does not exist ....
The court may go further
into the factual situation if he desires, but is
under no original or continuing obligation to
do so.
152 United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir.
1967), not mentioned by Mandell, said that in the
case of appointed counsel it is especially important
for the court to determine that no prejudice will
result from multiple representation. 374 F.2d at 761.
'MUnited States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1263
n.II (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976)
(prior representation of prosecution witness) said
that on notification "it became the duty of the district
judge to seek out the facts surrounding the alleged
conflict."
14 525 F.2d at 677.
153 United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478
F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973).

pressed approval for the practice of on-therecord inquiry by the court, and seem to have
left room for further consideration of the question, perhaps in the context of a more suitable
case.
The Second Circuit, which in Paz-Sierra defended the court's reliance on the attorney's
judgment, distinguishes situations where the
court has notice of inconsistent interests. United
States v. DeBeny'
held that when the trial
court becomes aware of potential conflict it
should conduct a careful inquiry, failing which
the burden of proof on the question of prejudice shifts to the government.
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Unlike the

more definite rule of the District of Columbia
Circuit, which assumes the possibility of conflict
in all cases, the obligation to conduct a hearing
attaches only when the court is made aware of
potential conflicts. In DeBerry, the trial judge
had notice of possible conflict when the Government informed the court it had reason to
believe one of two co-defendants would testify
on behalf of the other. Edwards and DeBarry
were convicted of possession of drugs. Edwards
had shipped a suitcase containing bricks of
marijuana from California to New York, where
DeBerry had picked it up. At a suppression
hearing, DeBerry said a man had given him
$50 to collect the suitcase, but he did not know
the man's name. The Government thought that
Edwards would attempt to exonerate DeBerry.
Defense counsel assured the court that Edwards would not testify, that only DeBerry
would take the stand, and that his testimony
would not incriminate Edwards. "Of course,
DeBerry did ... incriminate Edwards, which

may have been fine for DeBerry, but we fail to
see how Edwards could properly have been
advised to permit this to occur or to agree to it
as a matter of 'defense strategy."' 8 In these
circumstances, statements by defense counsel
to the trial court that the problem of possible
conflicts of interest had been carefully discussed with defendants was not equivalent to
direct interrogation by the judge. The convictions of both defendants were reversed and
156487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
7
11 Id. at 453-54 n.6.
" Id. at 453. The Government argued there was
no conflict of interests because the deliberate defense
strategy, agreed to by both defendants, consisted in
shifting blame to Edwards in an "uncle" type relationship. The court felt such a strategy would in itself be
an impermissible conflict. Id. at 454.
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remanded for a new trial either with separate
counsel or following a determination by the
judge that the defendants knowingly waived
their right to conflict-free representation. 159
The various approaches to the issue of pretrial inquiry into potential conflicts reflect the
tension between a court's duty to protect the
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and the utility of joint representation as a means of reducing the delays,
the cost, and the duplication of effort often
involved in separate representation of co-defendants presenting the same defense to a
common charge. Investigation into the possibility of inconsistent interests raises problems of
interfering with the attorney-client relation and
delving into the details of defense strategy.
There are undoubtedly difficulties in ascertaining how much investigation is sufficient. Furthermore, a general pre-trial inquiry does not
solve the problem of unforeseeable conflicts
which arise during the course of the trial.
A possible solution when defendants retain
their own counsel is for the court to make a
preliminary determination, such as described
in Campbell v. United States, 160 that the decision

to share counsel was not dictated by lack of
funds and ignorance of available alternatives.
This procedure, perhaps accompanied by a
warning of the risks of multiple representation,
would not interfere with the right to counsel of
one's choice, but would rather provide information relevant to making the choice. The
brief inquiry and warning should not be for
the purpose of eliciting a waiver of the right to
conflict-free representation, however, because
it seems questionable that in the absence of
specific indications of inconsistent interests,
such a waiver could be the knowing, intelligent
waiver required when the right to counsel is at
1
stake .16
Rather than require further inquiry by the
judge into potential conflicts, the better approach is generally to rely on counsel to bring
conflicts to the attention of the court, and to
impose obligations on the trial judge only when
he has some notice of possible inconsistencies
in the defense. The difficulty with inquiring
into potential conflicts when there is nothing
119
Id. at 454.
160352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See text accom-

panying notes 131-32 supra.
161 See discussion following note 193 infra.
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specific to indicate in what form the conflict
might arise is that any investigation of the
defense is necessarily general and may be quite
far-reaching. However, if the judge is notified
of potential conflicts because defense counsel
moves to withdraw or because the prosecution
moves to disqualify common counsel and require separate representation, the judge's inquiry into defense strategy can focus on the
specific problems alleged, thus avoiding the
general questioning which, it has been suggested,"' threatens to intrude on the attorney-

client relationship or to infringe the accused's
fifth amendment protections. In the same way,
the general posture of the case or situations
especially conducive to creating conflicts, 16 3
should alert the judge to the necessity for
investigating possibly inconsistent interests, and
again, his inquiry can focus on specific areas of
concern.
Some courts suggest that the duty of the trial
judge to inquire into potential conflicts varies
depending on whether counsel is retained or
appointed.16 The distinction cannot reasonably

be supported in terms of reliance on counsel to
recognize and give notice to the court of the
inconsistent interests of his clients. The distinction seems rather to rest upon the notion that
when the court appoints counsel it assumes an
obligation to anticipate conflicts because it
makes an implicit determination that the appointment is appropriate and will be effective.
Consistent with this obligation, the judge has a
duty to make some inquiry into the feasibility
of joint representation. But absent a particular
reason to believe that a common defense may
prejudice one of the accused, the inquiry
162

See note 123 and text following note 149supra.

'63See text between notes 51 and 119supra.
l'6 See note 152 supra. The court in Foxworth v.

Wainwright, 516 F.2d at 1076 stated that the "trial
judge has an obligation ... to anticipate conflicts
reasonably foreseeable at the outset of the case, when
counsel is appointed." The court further notes, citing
Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975), "[i]n this case we address
solely the question whether it was error to appoint
one attorney for three defendants .... Joint representation by retained counsel is a different question
entirely." Id. at 1076 n.4. Fitzgerald (issue of incompetent representation) distinguishes retained from appointed counsel on the basis of state action. See Note,
89 HARv. L. REV., supra note 6, for a critical review
of the Fitzgerald decision, and Waltz, supra note 1 at
296-301 for a general discussion of state action theories relating to sixth amendment claims.
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should be a summary one, limited by the same
fifth and sixth amendment considerations
which are considered relevant in cases of retained counsel. Only specific indications of potential conflict would entail a more detailed
scrutiny.
Even if the trial court has a clear obligation
to warn defendants of the risks of sharing
counsel or to inquire into conflicts when it has
notice that defendants' rights may be jeopardized, it is not clear what is accomplished by
shifting the burden of proof to the government
on appeal when no inquiry has been made.
This issue is sometimes discussed in terms of
proof of conflict, 165 and sometimes in terms of
proof of prejudice.166 Surely the defendants
must still show that some conflict of interests
existed at trial, since there is no constitutional
right to separate counsel absent such a conflict.
Perhaps shifting the burden of proof would, as
in Lollar, amount to a greater willingness by
ihe court to infer conflict from slight indications in the record. Or perhaps, if it is proof of
prejudice which is at issue, shifting the burden
to the government may indicate that some
167
harm to defendants will be presumed.
On the other hand, if the trial court has
warned defendants of the risks of joint representation and has made a preliminary inquiry
into the possibility of inconsistent interests,
there may be a question, as suggested by the
168
of
First Circuit in United States v. Foster,
increasing the defendants' burden on appeal
to prove that he actually was harmed by a
conflict. If the standard of review is ordinarily
to define a relevant conflict of interests which
disadvantaged the defense, it is difficult to see
what a heavier burden of proof would amount
to except requiring the defendant to show that
the conflict substantially contributed to his conviction. This is precisely what Glasser said
should not be required. Rather than a scale of
burdens of proof depending on the degree to
which either the court or the defendant should
have foreseen a conflict, the standard on appeal
should be based on whether or not the defendant clearly waived his right to conflict-free
16

See text accompanying note 147 supra.

16 See text accompanying note 143 supra.

167 This seems to have been the result in DeBerry,
where the court reversed the convictions of both
defendants.
" 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

representation. A warning of a general risk
cannot provide the same basis for a knowing,
intelligent waiver as can specific indications of.
inconsistent interests. Just as the judge's duty
to foresee conflicts can reasonably be made to
depend on notice of inconsistencies, so should
the defendant's waiver be predicated on the
foreseeable risks.
DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL

A few recent cases raise the question whether
a judge can disqualify an attorney from representing several clients in a situation where the
clients themselves either have not objected to
being jointly represented, or have actually insisted on retaining their chosen counsel in the
face of the prosecution's objection that serious
potential conflicts of interest render the multiple representation constitutionally defective.
The issue turns on the right to waive the sixth
amendment guarantee of conflict-free representation. Most personal constitutional guarantees can be waived, subject to the standard
of a knowing and intelligent waiver. 69 But it is
not entirely clear whether this right of waiver
is absolute, or whether it can be limited by
other important interests. If the right is not
absolute, the judge may have not only a duty
to determine the existence of potential conflicts, but also the power to require separate
counsel regardless of the desires of counsel
and clients.
The issue of waiver has been raised in two
different contexts: by witnesses in a grand jury
proceeding and by defendants in a criminal
169See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(a waiver is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (valid waivers
should be "knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences.") A waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel is not generally implied
from the attendant circumstances, but must be expressly and intelligently stated. Glasser refused to
imply a waiver from the defendant's failure to renew
his objection to sharing counsel. See text accompanying note 18supra. See also Virgin Islands v. Hernandez, 476 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir. 1973) (no waiver
implied from a silent record). Therefore, the distinction between retained and appointed counsel should
be irrelevant to the issue of waiver. See Craig v.
United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954) (immaterial whether counsel was appointed or retained). But
see Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d
271 (8th Cir. 1970), discussed supra note 126.

I
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COMII9ENTS
prosecution. In Pirillo v. Takiff, 170 the Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court held that the supervising
judge of a grand jury proceeding may in certain
circumstances disapprove the multiple representation of subpoenaed witnesses. During a
grand jury investigation of corruption in the
Philadelphia Police Department, the Special
Prosecutor had brought to the attention of
supervising Judge Takiff the possibility of a
conflict of interests in the joint representation
of twelve police officers, since each would be
questioned about each other's conduct in connection with the taking of bribes from bar
owners. There was also a problem of inconsistent interests in that the fees of attorney Pirillo
were being paid by the Fraternal Order of
Police (F.O.P.), an organization which stren-

uously opposed any cooperation with investigations into police corruption. 171 The Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court upheld Judge Takiff's
order to remove Pirillo as counsel primarily on
the basis of the impropriety of this fee arrangement,'1 72 but it also sustained the order that the

witnesses engage (or be appointed) separate
counsel. Reasoning from the requirement of
grand jury secrecy, the court felt that where
each witness was a potential defendant, and
where there was a possibility that each might
170 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
17 341 A.2d at 899.
172 Pirillo's conflicting obligations to F.O.P. and to
his clients harmed both the state interest in effective
grand jury investigation and the interests of any
client who might stand to gain from cooperation
with the Special Prosecutor.
[P]etitioner Pirillo testified that whenever a police officer indicated that he might consider
cooperating, he would immediately remove
himself as counsel and advise the witness to hire
another attorney. This fee arrangement clearly
has a chilling effect upon a police witness who is
considering cooperation, since his access to
F.O.P. paid counsel depends directly on his
agreement not to cooperate ....
[Also, Pirillo]
would discuss the possibility of a witness cooperating only when the witness had come to him
and raised the possibility. The failure of petitioner Pirillo to raise the subject of cooperation,
apparently as a result of his fee arrangement
with the F.O.P., deprives the witnesses of their
right to the full and complete loyalty of their
attorney.
Id. at 904. The court specifically stated that the order
prohibiting an F.O.P.-related attorney applied only
to the grand jury proceeding, and did not restrict
recourse to F.O.P. lawyers for other legal problems.
Id. at 906.
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incriminate another, it was "inappropriate for
the supervising judge to permit multiple representation," since secrecy prevented the witnesses from knowing the full extent of conflicting interests. 73 Petitioners first argued that a
prohibition of multiple representation impaired their right to counsel of their own choosing and denied the attorney's right to practice
his profession. The court felt that neither of
these rights is absolute, but may be balanced
with important state interests or with other
individual constitutional guarantees. Petitioners then claimed to have waived their constitutional right to effective counsel, but the court
suggested that the waiver might be defective in
a situation in which full disclosure was restricted. 74 However, the decision did not specifically rely on this ground, but primarily
considered the important state interest in effective grand jury investigations.
The Government made this same argument
of public interest in support of a motion to
require separate counsel for witnesses in a
federal grand jury investigation of the National
Maritime Union.' 75 The Third Circuit, without
deciding whether or not it accepted the Pirillo
theory of balancing interests ,176 held there was
not sufficient evidence to support the district
court's order for separate counsel for the nine
341 A.2d at 906.
Id. The court also mentioned that the concept
of grand jury secrecy is itself jeopardized by multiple
representation because the attorney may feel obliged
to reveal to one client the testimony of another. 341
A.2d at 903, n.5. The District of Columbia Circuit
found the Pirillo reasoning with regard to grand jury
secrecy requirements to be inapplicable to federal
courts. There is "no general obligation on the part
of a grand jury witness to refrain from disclosing the
contdnts of his testimony before the grand jury." In
re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531
F.2d 600, 606-07 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (multiple
representation of twenty-one union pressman, witnesses in a grand jury investigation into damages to
newspaper
machinery during a strike).
7
In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975,
536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976).
176 Pirillo was distinguished by the fee arrangement, but the court assumed that:
[T]he government may obtain, in appropriate
circumstances, judicial interference with private
arrangements for multiple legal representation
of witnesses called to tesify before a grand jury,
on the theory that the multiple representation
impedes the effectiveness of the grand jury
investigation,
Id. at 1012.
17

74

1
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witnesses on the ground that multiple representation frustrated the grand jury investigation. 77 Specifically, the witnesses had invoked
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but there was no evidence to indicate whether the fact of separate counsel would
make any difference 78to their continuing assertion of the privilege.
Without more-and there is no more in this
record -appellants' invocation of the Fifth
Amendment before a grand jury investigating
them, jointly and severally, could not serve to
vitiate the important right to legal representation
of one's choosing.7
The Government also challenged the multiple
representation by alleging potential conflicts of
interests if it should seek to offer immunity to
one of the witnesses. The court rejected this
argument, pointing out that no offer had in
fact been made, and that counsel had in any
case indicated he would withdraw if a conflict
arose.

180

In United States v. Garcia,' the Fifth Circuit
considered the issue of waiver by defendants
in the context of a criminal trial. The district
court, on a pre-trial motion by the Government, had disqualified three attorneys from
representing nine members of the narcotics
division of the Houston Police Department
charged with conspiracy and various federal
tax and drug violations. 8 2 The Government
alleged conflicts of interest among the defendants and between defendants and potential
prosecution witnesses (unindicted policemen
simultaneously represented by the same counsel). The defendants claimed they were not
subject to any conflicts of interest, but that
even if there were conflicts, they had a right to
17

Id. at 1010.

78

Id. at 1012.
at 1013.
'OId. at 1012-13. In the case of In re Investigation
Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), the attorney responded to the hazards of
multiple representation by advising the witnesses as
a group and refusing to consult with them individually. There was no evidence in the case whether the
witnesses even considered the attorney, paid by the
union, to be their personal counsel. Id. at 607.
"81517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir, 1975).
182 Orders disqualifying an attorney were held to
be appealable under the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen v, Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949). 517 F.2d at 275. The same rule applied in
the grand jury context. 536 F.2d at 1011.
'

7

1 1 Id.

waive their sixth amendment protections.
Without determining that the multiple representation would result in ineffective assistance
of counsel, 8 3 the court held that defendants
could waive the constitutional guarantee of
conflict-free representation.'84
Relying on the Supreme Court cases which
set forth the standard for an effqctive waiver
of a constitutional right,'8 5 and cases upholding
the validity of waiver of specific rights,8 6 the
court concluded that there is no basis for distinguishing one constitutional right from another.
The Government contention that it is impossible to waive the right to effective assistance of
counsel where there are serious conflicts of
interest "is novel and unfounded.

18 7s

The-cases draw no distinction between waiver of
the right to remain silent during interrogation,
the right to confer with counsel, the right to
representation by competent counsel at trial, the
right to contest accusations of criminality
through a plea of not guilty, the right to a jury
trial, and the right to be present at trial. 188
Garcia and other cases involving a defendant's right to waive effective assistance of coun,
se 18s cite Faretta v. California' 0" as indirectly
supporting a defendant's right to counsel of
his own choosing. Farettaupheld the right of a
defendant to conduct his own defense and
found that the Constitution forbids a state from
183 517 F.2d at 275. The court found that since
defendants may waive their rights, there was no
need on a pre-trial appeal to "evaluate the actual or
potential ineffectiveness of counsel occasioned by
alleged conflicts of interest." Id. at 277.
'Id. at 276. See also United States v. ArmedoSarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975), holding that
a defendant may waive his rights to effective assistance of counsel and to confrontation of witnesses in
a situation where counsel's law firm had previously
defended prospective prosecution witnesses.

185See note 169 supra.

186Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269 (1942) (defendant can waive trial by jury
without advice of counsel); Patton v, United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930) (accused may waive right to trial
by a constitutional jury of twelve).

187517 F.2d at 277.
'a

Id. at 276.

'89E.g,, In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21,
1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1013 n.4 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d
Cir. 1975).
190422 U.S. 806 (1975). For an analysis of Faretta,
see Note, Due Process-ProSe Defense, 66 J,CRIM. L.
& 0.400 (1975).
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forcing a lawyer on an unwilling defendant.1 91
The Supreme Court considered the waiver
issue in Faretta to be the defendant's competence to make a choice, not his legal knowledge
and skills.
The right to defend is personal. The defendant,
and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the
personal consequences of a conviction. It is the
defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case
counsel is to his advantage. And although he
may conduct his own defense ultimately to his
own detriment, his choice must be honored out
of "that respect for the
individual which is the
92
life-blood of the law."1
Faretta seems to lend support to an absolute
right to waive effective assistance of counsel.
Yet it does not necessarily follow that since a
court may not force a lawyer on a defendant it
may not disqualify the particular lawyer whom
the defendant has chosen, leaving him free to
choose another. There are two considerations
which may serve to limit a defendant's ability
to waive effective assistance of counsel.
For a waiver to be valid, the court must
make a determination that the defendant's
choice is in fact knowing and intelligent.' 93 In
United States v. Bernstein, 194 the trial court re-

fused to accept a waiver of conflict-free representation. The defendant appealed her conviction on the ground that she had been denied
representation by counsel of her choice when
the judge ordered her attorney, who was jointly
representing co-defendants,' 195 to terminate his
representation of her. The judge had determined that inconsistent defenses were probable
in a situation where employers and employee
had an interest in shifting blame onto each
1 96
other.
191422 U.S. at 815, 836.
"Id. at 834, (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.

337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
9I Cf. United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d at 1043

("the waiver must be deliberate and made with an

understanding of the conflicting interests and the
dangers resulting from them.") See note 94 supra.
194 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976). The defendants in
Bernstein were convicted of conspiracy, bribery and
false statement offenses in connection with applications for FHA mortgage insurance.
"' Id. at 787. The co-defendants were paying the
attorney's fee.
196 The defenses actually offered at trial were that
the defendant employee claimed she had simply
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On appeal, the Second Circuit approved the
trial court's action, saying that while a defendant's choice of counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court, "where there is
a serious possibility that a definite conflict of
interest will arise, the necessities of soundjudicial administration require the court to take
command of the situation.' 1 97 The court up-

held the trial judge's determination that the
defendant's attempted waiver was not knowing
and intelligent.
The court's interrogation of [defendant] established that she was not prepared to have the
court stand by and do nothing in the event an
actual prejudicial action on the part of her lawyer
arose. In other words, her waiver was not without strings.

9

Thus in the event of a serious foreseeable
conflict, a defendant may be reluctant to make
a full and explicit waiver of his constitutional
protections. But even if the advantages of presenting a common defense seem to outweigh
the risks of prejudice, so that a defendant is
willing to waive his rights, there may nonetheless be justification for the court to disqualify
an attorney representing defendants who have
reasonably foreseeable conflicts of interest. In
this situation, not only the defendants' rights
are involved, but also the ethical obligations of
the attorney. The court, in exercising supervisory authority over members of the bar, has
the power to enforce the ethical standard which
requires an attorney to decline multiple representation unless "it is obvious he can adequately
represent the interest of each [client]."' 19 Significantly, even cases which have explicitly approved waiver have not done so in the face of
followed standard office procedures and obeyed orders, while her employers, the co-defendants,
claimed she had acted on her own. Id. at 788.
97
1
Id.
198

Id.

99
1'
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR5-105 (c), supra note 125. The Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Garcia clearly stated the issue when
it said:
Whether the holding in Faretta should be extended to require that the court accede to a
defendant's choice of counsel in the face of a
conflict of interest, thus tolerating not only a
breach of professional ethics by counsel but
representation which the court finds inadequate
is a question we need not decide today.
529 F.2d at 1043.
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a clear conflict of interests. The Garcia court
expressly declined to determine whether the
"multiple representation ... in this case will
200
result in ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court had no notice of any actual, present
conflict. Similarly, the Third Circuit, considering the Government's allegations of potential
conflicts in multiple representation of grand
jury witnesses, found no evidence of actual
conflict where no offer of immunity had been
made to a particular defendant. 2 1 In United
States v. Liddy202 the court considered not only
the validity of defendants' waivers but also
evidence that might show actual, present conflicts, indicating that a waiver might not be
accepted in all circumstances.
Implicit in these decisions is the tension between the personal rights of an accused and
the integrity of the judicial system. The right
to counsel of one's choice must undoubtedly be
respected by the courts, 20 3 even when the pros-

ecution attacks the choice as being improperly
motivated. 0 4 There are, however, frequent
expressions to the effect that this right is not
absolute, nor on a par with the right to have
the assistance of counsel.
While it cannot be disputed that the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution grants an accused in a criminal prosecution an absolute unqualified right to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense, it does not necessarily follow
that his right to a particular counsel is absolute

and unqualified. [Defendant's]

freedom of

517 F.2d at 275 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying note 180 supra.
202 348 F. Supp. 198 (D.D.C. 1972), discussed in
note 138 supra.
203 See, e.g., United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d
337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969)
where the court said:
[T]he potential hazards of joint representation
are as likely to be present when counsel is
retained as when assigned. However, defendants who retain counsel also have a right of
constitutional dimensions to representation by
counsel of their own choice.
"Defendants are free to employ counsel of their
choice, and courts have little leeway in interfering
with that choice." United States v. Valenzuela, 521
F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
916 (1976).
214 "Individuals are free to waive the constitutional
protections otherwise afforded them, regardless of
their motivation." United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d
at 276-77.
200
201

choice of counsel may not be manipulated to
subvert the orderly procedure of the courts or
to interfere
with the fair administration of jus20
tice 5
Since the right to be represented by a particular
attorney cannot be insisted upon when it would
unduly delay the proceedings, 20 6 it should not
be permitted to override the obligations of the
court to maintain the ethical standards basic to
fair representation. When the court has notice
of an actual conflict of interests2 7 which exists
before trial, 20 8 it surely has the power as supervising authority over the conduct of counsel to
require separate representation despite a
knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendants. In Faretta, the Court emphasized the
defendant's right to choose between asserting
his constitutional guarantees or dispensing with
them, even if his choice works "ultimately to
his own detriment." But this is not to say that
an accused may also waive the obligations of
his attorney, or force the court to permit representation which it knows to be defective. The
pursuit of justice requires not only consideration for the rights of defendants, it also requires respect for the integrity of the courts.
205 United States v. Sexton, 473 F.2d 512, 514 (5th
Cir. 1973) (citations omitted). See also United States
ex rel. Baskerville v. Deegan, 428 F.2d 714, 716 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970).
206 See, e.g., United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316
(3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964) (court
refused to adjourn when defendant's counsel became
ill, but made a temporary assignment of a co-defendant's counsel when the replacement chosen by defendant requested a two month continuance); United
States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 940 (1963) (co-defendants' counsel was assigned to represent defendant).
207 Some line must be drawn between an actual
present conflict and the probable development of
conflicts. To be knowing and intelligent, a waiver
should ordinarily be made only in the context of
reasonably foreseeable risks. On the other hand, to
justify disqualifying a defendant's chosen counsel the
court must be aware of an existing conflict which
vitiates the attorney's ability to represent all his clients
fairly.
208 Conflicts which develop during the course of
trial after a valid waiver would be similar to detrimental developments after the waiver of any other constitutional right, and not justify disrupting the proceedings with a claim for new counsel. A possible exception could be made for conflicts created by government action and not comprehended in the original
waiver, such as an offer of immunity to one defendant.

